The market-oriented approach promoted by the European Central Bank in the design of its refinancing operations creates incentives to credit insitutions to use the interbank market to manage their liquidity needs. In this context, we examine the ability of the overnight segment to guarantee the timely provision of unsecured funds to banks to smoothly absorb their liquidity shocks. This paper specifically focuses on the speed of mean reversion in transaction costs and available depth in this market for unsecured funds. The reported evidence points to nonlinear liquidity adjustments and identifies liquidity, market activity and the institutional setting as significant determinants of the observed resiliency regimes. Our analysis further highlights the role played by the time dimension of market liquidity in the quality of order execution in this market.
Introduction
Resilient financial markets absorb liquidity shocks in a smooth way, without affecting prices. Resiliency accordingly guarantees the provision of market liquidity (and hence, the ability to transact) under quiet and more stressful conditions. Against the market-oriented approach promoted by the European Central Bank in the design of its refinancing operations, the ability of banks to manage their liquidity needs in the interbank market at any time takes on crucial importance.
This issue appears even more relevant today against the experience of the recent turmoil episode that shocked the money market in the summer of 2007 as it has become obvious that a prolonged illiquidity situation of banks may rapidly damage their solvency.
The speed of reversion of transaction costs or depth to their long-term averages is traditionally used to capture this time dimension of market liquidity. 1 In the literature, the magnitude of resiliency is accordingly captured by the number of quote updates required for spreads or depth to return to their pre-shock levels (Degryse, De Jong, Van Ravenswaaij and Wuyts 2005) or by the probability that liquidity is restored before the occurrence of a new transaction (Foucault, Kadan and Kandel 2005) . In this respect, the mean reversion framework set up in Kempf, Mayston and Yadav (2009) conveniently quantifies this temporal dimension of market liquidity and therefore opens the way for new investigations of its dynamics over time or across assets.
Examinations of the resilience of order book liquidity form the most significant part of the empirical literature, which mostly focuses on the stock market. The event-study methodology used in Degryse et al. (2005) provides high-frequency evidence of weakly-resilient spreads but strongly resilient depth surrounding the execution of aggressive orders in the limit order book at Paris Bourse. The design of the German Stock Exchange appears strongly resilient to endogenous liquidity shocks: the Xetra liquidity measure (XLM) is indeed particularly resilient to the execution of large transactions (Gomber, Schweickert and Theissen 2004) .
Mixed evidence is however reported by the authors on the ability of this market to absorb stock-specific news (their exogenous shocks). According to Kempf et al. (2009) , spreads and depth in this market additionally tend to have asymmetric speeds of reversion to their long-term averages. Their analysis also confirms the independence of resiliency as a dimension of market liquidity, which conveys complementary information. On the London Stock Exchange, the resiliency of SETS following aggressive orders is unfrequent. When resiliency occurs, the reaction is fast, with a half-life of 20 seconds (Large 2007) . Furthermore, the speed of mean reversion of liquidity parameters appears sensitive to the dynamics of the market. Coppejans, Domowitz and Madhavan (2004) argue that the volatility of Swedish stock index futures drives the resilience of market depth. The vector autoregressions applied in Hmaied, Grar and Sioud (2006) further suggest a positive relation between resiliency and trading frequency on the Tunisian exchange. The dynamics of the pricing error inferred from market prices on the New York Stock Exchange provide additional evidence of a triangular relation between the three dimensions of market liquidity (Dong, Kempf and Yadav 2007) . As those authors show, resiliency also tends to co-move across stocks, and as such is a component of systematic liquidity risk. Despite this examination of a hybrid market, the temporal adjustments of liquidity parameters under other market designs nevertheless remain an open question.
In this paper, we take a new look at the speed of mean reversion of liquidity parameters in the overnight money market. This segment connects banks facing short-term liquidity shocks and provides the bulk of liquidity between the refinancing operations of the European Central Bank. The market-oriented approach promoted by the ECB in the design of its refinancing operations indeed creates strong incentives to credit institutions to use interbank markets to manage their liquidity needs to end the reserve maintenance period in a balanced position.
Against the backdrop of the recent financial turmoil that started in the summer of 2007 over which the volume exchanged in the interbank market has decreased markedly, the ability of this market to guarantee the timely provision of unsecured funds under quiet and more stressful conditions therefore takes on crucial importance.
Our contribution to the literature is essentially threefold. First, this paper extends Kempf et al.'s (2009) work to a market where utilitarian motivations dominate other motivations to trade. Specifically, we examine the resilience of liquidity in the euro area overnight money market for the first time. In particular, we assess the stability of resiliency over time and look for evidence of nonlinear liquidity adjustments in this market. Second, given the influence of the rules defining the implementation of the monetary policy in the Eurosystem on the cost of trading and the available market depth (Beaupain and Durré 2008), we examine whether the institutional setting similarly affects the speed of reversion of spreads and depth to their long-term averages in the overnight segment of the money market. Third, we assess the sensitivity of market quality to the strength of resiliency in liquidity parameters. Unlike previous studies, we draw our conclusions from several years of high-frequency data and the robustness of our findings is reinforced through an examination of several high-and low-frequency transaction cost and price impact estimators.
Our results can be summarised as follows. The resilience of liquidity parameters is particularly sensitive to the implementation of the monetary policy in the Eurosystem: the introduction of the current design of the operational framework in March 2004 has improved the speed of reversion of spreads and depth to their long-term averages. Furthermore, we report evidence of nonlinear liquidity adjustments in this market. Resiliency varies over time, and is particularly sensitive to liquidity, market activity, and institutional factors. Finally, our analysis of the quality of the overnight segment shows a strong influence of resiliency on the size of the EONIA spread and the quality of execution of electronic orders.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data for interbank transactions and the estimators of market liquidity used in our analysis. The speed of mean reversion of spreads and depth in the overnight money market is examined in Section 3, where we also identify determinants of the nonlinear adjustments of liquidity in this market. Section 4 checks the sensitivity of market quality to the speed of mean reversion in spreads and depth. We conclude in Section 5.
3
In the euro area, interbank transactions are alternatively executed electronically or over-the-counter (mainly in the form of bilateral deals or through voice brokers).
Empirical evidence nevertheless suggests that the order flow captured by the e-MID electronic platform is representative of the dynamics of the whole money market (Beaupain and Durré 2010). Data for the orders filled on the electronic platform is accordingly provided by e-MID and contains records of all overnight transactions executed through their systems. When a trade occurs, a new record is created that reports the date, time, price, size and side of the deal (i.e., buy or sell). Our sample covers the period from 4 September 2000 to 31 December 2007.
Erroneous records and extreme outliers are removed from the raw tick-by-tick data provided by the platform. 2 In spite of more stable market conditions in the euro area between January and August 2008, the period beyond December 2007 was not incorporated in our sample for the following reasons. First, a larger recourse to emergency liquidity assistance around the world has reinforced the stigma effect of credit institutions facing liquidity shortages despite a more frequent intervention of central banks. Second, as a related matter, banks' solvency has also become more uncertain. Third, growing concern about potential price pressures in the medium term has motivated a 25 bps increase of the key ECB interest rates on 3 July 2008. Finally, the introduction of a fixed-rate full-allotment procedure by the ECB to offset market distortions following the the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 has radically affected the operation of this market. This paper focuses on the temporal dynamics of the first two dimensions of market liquidity identified in the theoretical literature (Kyle 1985) , that is, tightness and depth. For this purpose, the cost of trading in this market is inferred from high-frequency and low-frequency spread estimators. Price impact, that is, the reaction of prices to the transactions executed in the market, is similarly used to approximate market depth. To make our findings more robust, we examine several alternative spread and depth estimators (see Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka our estimators are computed at the daily frequency. Roll's (1984) implicit effective spread. Roll (1984) introduces a method for inferring the effective spread from the first order serial covariance of price changes. In the spirit of Stoll (2000) , this implicit spread is extracted from price changes observed over consecutive transactions (∆p t ) and Roll's (1984) estimator is accordingly computed as:
Transaction costs
where Cov is the first order serial covariance.
Stoll's (2000) traded spread. The traded spread is measured as the difference between the average price of buy transactions (i.e., trades hitting the ask) and the average price of sell trades (i.e., executed on the bid side of the market) (Stoll 2000) . We accordingly compute the traded spread from the transactions executed on the electronic platform. The equally-weighted average traded spread (EWTS) gives an equal weight to all transactions and is computed as:
where p b (resp. p s ) is the price of the b th buy trade (resp. s th sell trade) executed in the market.
We alternatively construct a time-weighted average traded spread (TWTS) in which the weight of each observation is a function of the number of seconds before a new transaction occurs on the same side of the market (i.e., a function of the time the related quote remains unchanged in the market), that is,
where ω b (resp. ω s ) is the number of seconds between trade b and b + 1 (resp. s and s + 1).
Realised spread. The realised spread captures the temporary component of the effective spread and is here measured as:
where D t is 1 (resp. -1) if the t th transaction is a buy (resp. sell), p t is the price of trade t and p t+5 is the price of a transaction executed 5 minutes after trade t.
Price impact
Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio. Amihud (2002) shows that the illiquidity of a market is a function of the absolute change in the price in reaction to a given volume of transaction. The illiquidity ratio of day d is accordingly computed as:
where Q d is the total volume exchanged on day d. Kyle's (1985) 
Resiliency
In the mean reversion framework developed in Kempf et al. (2009) , the strength of resiliency is defined as the magnitude of the mean reversion in liquidity proxies.
To examine the resilience of transaction costs and depth in the overnight segment of the money market, we adopt their model specification, which takes the following form: Table 2 shows that depth proxies converge more rapidly to their long-term averages than our transaction cost estimators. Resiliency estimates across sub-samples are also reported in Table 2 . The resilience of liquidity strengthened between Sample 1 and Sample 2 (Quiet): 3 of our 4 spread proxies revert more quickly to their long-term averages under the current design of the operational framework (the resiliency of EWRS is very similar in the 2 sub-samples). Depth is also more resilient in Sample 2 (Quiet), compared to its speed of mean reversion in Sample 1.
Transaction costs appear less resilient under heightened pressure for finding overnight liquidity (Sample 2 -Turmoil): spreads revert more slowly to their long-term averages in Sample 2 (Turmoil) where the magnitude of our β coefficients dropped below their values in Sample 1. Under stress, depth also appears more resilient than spreads. Mixed evidence is however reported on the resilience 3 First, the timing of the reserve maintenance period was changed so that a maintenance period always starts on the settlement day of the main refinancing operation following the Governing Council meeting at which the monthly assessment of the monetary policy stance is pre-scheduled. Second, changes to the standing facility rates are implemented at the start of the new reserve maintenance period. Finally, the maturity of the main refinancing operations was shortened from two weeks to one week. One of the main rationales for introducing these changes was the elimination of underbidding episodes in the weekly main refinancing operations. As a result, these changes have led to a situation in which expectations of key ECB interest rates are flat over the entire maintenance period, and there are thus no incentives for underbidding. For a detailed description of the operational framework, see ECB (2003) . 
Resiliency Regimes
The above analysis suggests that resiliency is affected by the rules defining the implementation of monetary policy in the Eurosystem and potentially exhibits a time-varying behaviour. To investigate this issue in greater details, we construct a Markov switching model which allows liquidity to switch between regimes of high and low resiliency. By contrast to the above analysis, the switch between regimes of resilience is determined endogenously without a priori references to the Eurosystem's operational framework or to the dynamics of this market. Our Markov-switching mean reversion model is accordingly specified as:
where α s is the regime-specific intercept, β s is the regime-specific resiliency proxy and σ 2 s is the regime-specific variance. 4 The model is estimated using Krolzig's (1997) MSVAR package in Ox 3.00 where the EM algorithm is used to achieve the maximisation of the likelihood function. We use the MSIAH model specification which allows different intercepts, coefficients and variances under the two regimes. 5 The model is estimated for the whole sample, and is constructed to include the number of lags of the dependent variable (i.e., N) which minimises information criteria. 6 The Markov switching model converges for the resiliencies of both the tightness and depth dimensions. Likelihood ratio tests further confirm the nonlinear dynamics of both liquidity dimensions in this market: LR tests of linearity are always strongly significant using Davies's (1977) upper bound, rejecting the null hypothesis of a single regime of resilience. The results are reported in Table 3 .
Spread resiliency is generally strong across our proxies (the mean reversion coefficient ranges from 0.7937 for EWRS to 0.9811 for ROLL) and occasionally switches to a regime of weaker mean reversion (with a coefficient of 0.4047 for TWTS to 0.4756 for EWTS). The regime of strong resilience (regime 1) captures more than 70% of all observations and is highly persistent: the probability of being in regime 1 on day d when day d−1 was already in regime 1, that is, p 11 , is 89% for ROLL, EWTS and TWTS and increases to 91.02% for EWRS. With an average duration of 9.84 (TWTS) to 11.13 (EWRS) days, this regime of high-resilience is more persistent than regime 2 (where the duration ranges from 3.14 for EWRS to 4.01 days for ROLL). Spread resiliency is also more volatile in the regime of weak resilience: the standard error of the regression increases significantly between regime 1 and regime 2.
Depth resiliency delivers a similar picture. Two regimes are also clearly identified: the mean reversion in AMIHUD and KYLEL proxies is generally strong but sometimes deteriorates to reach a regime of weaker resilience. The Markov switching model classifies most days into regime 1: more than 79% of all observations fall into this regime of strong resilience. The standard error inflates markedly between regime 1 and regime 2, where the magnitude of depth resiliency is weaker.
Similar to spread resiliency, regime 1 is on average more persistent than regime 2 (whereas the duration of regime 1 is close to 10 days, the duration of regime 2 is only about 2 days). The probability of a high resilience on day d when resilience was high on day d − 1 (i.e., p 11 ) is close to 90%, whereas the probability of staying in the regime of weak resilience on two consecutive days (i.e., p 22 ) drops to 58.95% for AMIHUD and 63.03% for KYLEL.
Regime Determinants
The above evidence hints at the presence of two regimes of spread and depth resiliency in the interbank market. The key issue is now to detect potential parameters that could increase (or decrease) the probability of being in one particular regime rather than the other. This part of our analysis relies on a probit model applied to the regime probabilities. 7 In this specification, an observation is assumed to belong in regime s if the probability of being in this regime on day d is greater than 0.5. 8
Given the specific design of this market and after controlling for the effect of liquidity and market activity documented in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Kempf et al. (2009) ), our set of potential regime determinants additionally includes institutional factors.
Liquidity. Empirical evidence reported in the literature suggests that the three liquidity dimensions are interconnected (Kempf et al. 2009 ). Wide spreads are typically associated with low depth conditions. Tight spreads and deep markets are similarly more resilient. We also expect a certain degree of persistence in resiliency: highly-resilient liquidity conditions on day d should favor high resilience on day d + 1. We accordingly test the hypothesis that the past level of resilience affects its current level and that tight spreads and deep markets improve the resilience of liquidity conditions in the market.
H1: Resiliency is persistent across days and is positively related to the other dimensions of market liquidity (i.e., transaction costs and the available market depth).
In the probit model, we include as regime determinants (i) a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the liquidity proxy was in the high regime of resilience on day d − 1 and is 0 otherwise, (ii) the size of the spread on day d, and (iii) the price impact proxy on day d.
Market activity.
Resiliency is expected to deteriorate as the order arrival rate increases, but strengthen as traders become more patient (Foucault et al. 2005 ). In the same vein, liquidity (Coppejans et al. 2004 ) and resiliency (Hmaied et al. 2006) tend to improve in more active markets. The available empirical evidence on the relation between resiliency and volatility (stress) is however not conclusive (see, e.g., Dong et al. (2007) or Kempf et al. (2009) ) and therefore deserves a careful examination. 
H2: Resiliency strengthens as trading becomes more active, but deteriorates as banks become more reluctant to trade and as uncertainty (stress) increases.

H3: The resilience of spreads and depth has increased with the current design of the operational framework but generally deteriorates over the last days of the reserve maintenance period, during main refinancing operations, around the press conference and in particularly stressful market conditions (i.e., over the financial turmoil).
The influence of institutional factors on the resilience of liquidity is investigated through the inclusion of a set of dummy variables controlling for the above effects.
As the literature suggests (see, e.g., Beaupain and Durré (2008) ), the institutional setting also influences the liquidity and activity of this market. We therefore remove the seasonality induced by the operational framework from the mean and variance of our proxies. For that purpose, we rely on Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen's (1992) technique (see Appendix A for more details). The evidence reported in Table 4 confirms the sensitivity of our spread and depth proxies to institutional factors: liquidity deteriorates (the mean and variance of our proxies increases) over the last days of the maintenance period, during main refinancing operations and over the recent financial turmoil, but has significantly improved with the introduction of the current design of the framework (the mean and variance of the proxies dropped significantly). Table 5 further shows that market participants face more stressful market conditions (RVOLA increases) and become more reluctant to trade large sizes (EWQTY drops) as trading becomes more active (NBTRD increases) during main refinancing operations and near the end of the maintenance period. Whereas the new framework has improved the activity of the segment, the reported evidence highlights the negative effect of the recent market turbulence on the volatility and average size of the transactions executed on the platform.
The deseasonalised proxies are used in the remaining of our analysis and therefore correspond to their unexpected component.
The determinants of spread resiliency regimes are reported in Table 6 . In our probit models, the baseline regime is the highly-resilient regime (i.e., regime 1).
Hence positive (resp. negative) coefficients point to a positive (resp. negative) relation between the variable and the regime of high resilience. All the tests reported in the Table are The speed of mean reversion in market depth is subject to similar forces. The evidence reported in Table 7 highlights the persistence of depth resiliency across days and its dependence on the contemporaneous depth available in the market.
By contrast to the regimes of spread resiliency, unexpected increases in market stress (RVOLA) do not alter the ability of the market to provide liquidity (i.e., depth). The resilience of the 5-minute price impact (KYLEL) appears inversely related to the reluctance of banks to exchange large sizes through the platform.
Finally, our tests confirm that institutional factors similarly drive the resilience of the first (transaction costs) and second (depth) dimensions of market liquidity.
Market Quality in Resiliency Regimes
From a microstructure perspective, the ability of a market to operate smoothly under quiet and more stressful conditions takes on particular importance. This issue appears even more relevant for overnight transactions as the interbank market is the initial and primary source of unsecured funds for banks, which allow them to absorb smoothly short-term liquidity shocks. In this context, the spread between the overnight market rate and the minimum bid (policy) rate is of crucial importance since it reflects the market conditions at which banks can meet their liquidity needs. By nature, and given the purpose of the overnight segment, this spread is exclusively affected by liquidity conditions in the market, part of which is determined by the liquidity directly provided by the ECB through its auctions.
Furthermore, its dynamics mechanically influence the other segments of the money market yield curve through arbitrage mechanisms. In particular, a stable spread will reduce the noisy signals affecting the dynamics of interest rates, and hence will ensure a better anchoring of the money market yield curve. By contrast, more volatile spreads may eventually increase risk premia along the yield curve: arbitrage transactions through derivatives become more difficult to execute, which in turn negatively affects the anchoring of the yield curve and the dynamics of The distribution of market spreads across regimes of transaction costs and depth resiliency is examined in Table 8 . In this Table, we consider the absolute proportional spread between the policy rate of the ECB and the average price A lower resilience of trading costs and depth negatively affects the size (mean and median) and variability (standard deviation) of the market spreads. The picture is very similar for all liquidity proxies examined in this paper.
Finally, we note that the specific design of the overnight segment of the euro area money market allows banks to alternatively execute their overnight trans-action through the electronic platform or over-the-counter (mainly through voice brokers or in the form of bilateral deals). Against this background, we finally deem important to assess the sensitivity of the quality of order execution on the electronic platform to the resilience of spreads and depth in this market. When liquidity is strongly resilient, shocks to prices should be short-lived and disappear rapidly. This contrasts with weakly resilient liquidity conditions under which shocks are expected to last longer. As a consequence, strongly-resilient markets should improve the execution quality of interbank transactions.
Our proxy for execution quality is the absolute proportional deviation of electronic transaction prices from the euro overnight index average (EONIA). When the daily average price of the transactions executed through e-MID systems is close to the EONIA, the platform executes orders at prices on average similar to the price of the orders executed over-the-counter. The emergence of a gap between the two averages correspondingly points to a deterioration of execution quality on the electronic platform. In the specific context of the euro area, two additional elements support our benchmark. First, as the EONIA panel tracks the largest market participants, the volume traded by this panel is considered representative of the whole overnight segment of the money market. Second, the electronic platform attracts more market participants than the EONIA panel, including most small-sized banks. The absence of significant price differences with the EONIA would accordingly suggest that transacting on the platform is independent of the size of the banks, which we also interpret as a factor of execution quality. Table 8 reports the mean, median, and variance of the absolute proportional deviation of e-MID transaction prices from the EONIA. This Panel also provides test statistics of the null hypothesis of equal means, medians, and variances of the measure across regimes of spread and depth resiliency. All tests confirm that strongly-resilient liquidity conditions improve the execution quality of electronic orders. The absolute price deviation is significantly weaker (the mean and median are reduced) and less volatile (the variance of the measure is lower) when spreads and depth quickly revert to their long-term averages. Again, the picture is very similar across all spreads and depth proxies.
Panel C of
In resilient markets, liquidity shocks are absorbed in a smooth way, without affecting prices. When a shock occurs that drains liquidity from the market, participants become increasingly concerned with the ability of the market to restore liquidity.
Weakly-resilient market conditions, under which liquidity shocks are absorbed very slowly, therefore hamper trading. When quoted spreads (i.e., transaction costs) deteriorate, exchanges become more costly to execute. Widening spreads are thus likely to deter market players from trading in the market. Similarly, when liquidity shocks reduce the available market depth, traders may be more reluctant to transact. For these reasons, strongly-resilient markets with a strong ability to absorb liquidity shocks in a smooth way attract market players and hence favor trading.
Against this background and given the importance of the overnight money market in the provision of unsecured liquidity to banks between the refinancing operations of the European Central Bank, we examine the speed of reversion of transaction costs and market depth to their long-term averages in this market. Appendix A Deseasonalisation Gallant et al. (1992) developed the following three-step deseasonalisation technique (in their original notation):
Mean equation:
where x is the set of variables that are assumed to cause the observed seasonality.
Variance equation:
Building on these equations, the adjusted (deseasonalised) measure is derived as:
where the authors use values of a and b such that the unadjusted and adjusted measures both have the same mean and standard deviation. Roll's (1984) implicit effective spread; EWTS (resp. TWTS) is the equally-weighted (resp. time-weighted) average traded spread (Stoll 2000) ; EWRS is the equally-weighted realised spread; AMIHUD is Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio; KYLEL is the 5-minute Kyle's (1985) lambda. For the sake of clarity, AMIHUD and KYLEL are resized (multiplied by 1,000,000). 0  0  0  1  0  0  Observations  102  102  102  102  102  102  This Table reports Table reports , and is 0 otherwise. Last Days is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 between the last MRO allotment of a maintenance period and the very last open day of that period, and is 0 otherwise. MRO Allotment is a dummy variable equal to 1 on main refinancing operations allotment days, and is 0 otherwise. Press Conf. is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for days on which decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB are communicated to the market, and is 0 otherwise. Turmoil is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 over the period from 8 August 2007 to 31 December 2007, and is 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are given in the parentheses. Table reports the effect of the institutional setting on the mean (Panel A) and variance (Panel B) of our activity proxies. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are given in the parentheses. This Table reports the probit estimates of depth regime determinants. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are given in the parentheses. All tests are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. The EONIA spread is the absolute proportional spread between the prevailing ECB policy rate and the average trade price of the largest market participants. The e-MID spread is based on all transactions executed through the electronic platform. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
